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DERRIDA’S ETHICAL TURN AND AMERICA: 
LOOKING BACK FROM THE CROSSROADS 
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM AND THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT 
Michel Rosenfeld∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Derrida has denied that his work took an ethical turn in the 1980s 
or 1990s.1  This may be true in the sense that deconstruction as an 
interpretive practice has an ethics of its own, a commitment to pursue 
relevant intertextual links wherever they may lead, regardless of how 
unconventional or unsettling that may be.  Derrida’s claim seems less 
convincing, however, in terms of deconstruction of the ethnical 
implications of major moral, social or political issues, such as law and 
justice, friendship, hospitality, forgiveness, the death penalty, and most 
recently, global terrorism.  In the latter cases, Derrida engages in the 
deconstruction of ethics as well as in the ethics of deconstruction.  And 
the deconstruction of ethics is ethical in as much as it is driven by the 
necessary but impossible call to reconciliation between self and other 
without compromising the irreducible singularity of either.2 
Force of Law,3 Derrida’s profound and path-breaking 
deconstruction of the relationship between law and justice, which more 
than any other single work marks the advent of his ethnical turn, was 
first presented in a 1989 public lecture in America—at the Cardozo 
School of Law, which was to become Derrida’s American law school 
and for the matter his law school tout court.4  That is significant, for 
 
 ∗  Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law. 
 1 See JACQUES DERRIDA, VOYOUS 64 (2003) [hereinafter DERRIDA, VOYOUS]. 
 2 See Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy 
and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
JUSTICE 152, 158 (Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson eds., 1992) 
[hereinafter Rosenfeld, Deconstruction]. 
 3 See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990) [hereinafter Derrida, Force of Law]. 
 4 Since 1989, and until shortly before his death, Derrida came yearly as a distinguished 
scholar in residence at the Cardozo School of Law.  Ironically, in spite of working on law, justice 
and many other subjects of great legal import, Derrida was largely ignored by the French legal 
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America is Europe’s “Other” and because it has arguably been much 
more open to difference over the last quarter century than has Europe.  
In other words, Derrida’s ethics is very much one focused on the other 
and on difference, and America was both “his” other and more open to 
difference. 
Contrasted to Derrida’s America is Habermas’s Europe—a Europe 
where identity predominates over difference and where Kantian reason 
and the spirit of the Enlightenment have been unleashed (or one may 
say redeployed) to crush the darker passions that wrought unspeakable 
destruction during World War Two.  Habermas’s Europe is one of 
transnational unity, of “constitutional patriotism.”5  Habermas, 
moreover, has in the past condemned Derrida’s deconstructive approach 
as fostering a reversion to a pre-Enlightenment mystique inimical to the 
project of modernity.6 
Whether deconstruction is pre-modern and hence a throwback to 
pre-Enlightenment approaches, or postmodern and accordingly tied to 
post-Enlightenment thought—be it anti-Enlightenment or an extension 
and transformation of Enlightenment thought—global terrorism as 
typified by the 9/11 attacks posed a formidable challenge to 
deconstruction.  As it does to Habermas’s modernist approach, steeped 
in the core values of the Enlightenment.  For the deconstructionist 
Derrida, the question is how can one mount a principled condemnation 
of terrorism if one has rejected or gone beyond enlightened reason and 
the value system associated with it?  For the Kantian modernist 
Habermas, on the other hand, the question is how can enlightened 
reason be still considered relevant given that the era of modernism has 
seen totalitarianism and the Holocaust followed by global terrorism? 
Habermas and Derrida agreed for the first time to share the stage to 
address these questions.7  Significantly, they both dealt with the 
relationship between terrorism and the Enlightenment, and though they 
embraced different views of it, they both placed themselves on the side 
of the Enlightenment.  Furthermore, whereas Habermas remained the 
consummate European he had always been, Derrida, in the end, sided 
with Europe8 thus apparently breaking with his American “identity” that 
went back to the late eighties.  Given Derrida’s recent death, this 
seeming repatriation in Europe culminates the journey begun with his 
 
academy, where the predominant formalism was inherently inhospitable to his deconstructive 
approach. 
 5 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 465-66, 499-500 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
 6 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 181-84 
(Frederick Lawrence trans.,1990). 
 7 See GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA, at xi (2003). 
 8 Id. at 116-18. 
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ethical turn in America.  Terrorism is thus not the only key ethical issue 
addressed by Derrida.  But it is the one that casts definitive light on his 
turn to ethics and on his detour through America to help tease out an 
ethics of difference and of the other. 
The larger normative question raised by global terrorism is whether 
an ethics of difference is altogether possible and whether its seeming 
opposite, an ethics of identity, is ultimately relevant.  Concerning the 
ethics of difference, if each singularity is irreducible, then how can the 
singularity of the global terrorist be cogently condemned as ethically 
unacceptable when most other singularities are not?  Concerning the 
ethics of identity, on the other hand, how can its condemnation of 
terrorism be given real bite when the identity it promotes is not a 
universally uncontestable one, but one closely aligned with that of 
contemporary Europe, or more precisely, of the European Union? 
These questions will be examined below by tracing Derrida’s turn 
to ethics and putting it into perspective against the ethics of identity, as 
well as by exploring how Derrida’s ethics of difference may be aligned 
or reconciled with the project of the Enlightenment.  Part I focuses on 
Derrida’s ethical turn and on its nexus to America.  Part II concentrates 
on the links between terrorism and the Enlightenment and how 
Derrida’s ethics of difference may be reconciled with the Enlightenment 
project.  Part III assesses whether the ethical implications of global 
terrorism are best handled under an ethics of identity or an ethics of 
difference.  Finally, based on the conclusion that neither the ethics of 
identity nor that of difference succeeds in coping with global terrorism, 
Part IV briefly looks at an alternative ethics that is better suited to deal 
with terrorism and that partakes of both identity and difference, namely 
an ethics of pluralism. 
 
I.     DIFFERENCE IN AMERICA AND DERRIDA’S TURN TO ETHICS 
 
Derrida has always been a philosopher of difference in both its 
spatial and temporal dimensions9—that is, a philosopher of multiplicity 
and diversity and a philosopher of deferral.  Derrida’s philosophy of 
difference, moreover, is firmly moored in continental Europe as it 
emerges out of a tradition that counts Nietzsche and Heidegger as close 
antecedents.10  It is therefore not deconstruction itself, but only its turn 
to ethics that can be plausibly linked to America.11 
 
 9 See Rosenfeld, Deconstruction, supra note 2, at 200 n.24 (deconstruction involves an 
ontological privileging of differences precluding unification of self and other). 
 10 See JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 109-36 (Alan Bass trans., 1982) 
(Derrida regards himself as a disciple of Heidegger). 
 11 In this context, both Europe and America should be taken symbolically and metaphorically 
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Derrida’s use of deconstruction to broach the question of the 
relation between law, justice and violence in the face of irreducible 
difference did not just happen to take place in the United States.12  
Indeed, Derrida’s conception of justice provides a crucial wholly radical 
role for difference, and since the 1960s, America, unlike Europe, 
became increasingly open to difference.  One need only refer to 
America’s civil rights movement, feminism and the struggle for gay 
rights.  In contrast, at the time Western Europe was above all bent on 
converging on a common identity through a supra-national construction 
that would culminate in the European Union.  This process, moreover, 
required downplaying differences for two separate but related purposes: 
to move away from past differences, such as in the case of Germany for 
whom integration into a transnational Europe was a means to distance 
itself from its Nazi past; and to forge future common identities as 
partners within the same economic and social space, and hopefully also 
within the same political space.13 
Derrida’s radical and revolutionary deconstruction of justice both 
inscribes itself in a tradition going back to Aristotle and stands the 
latter’s conception on its head.  For Aristotle, justice requires treating 
equals equally and unequals unequally.14  Consistent with this, justice 
requires adoption of general rules that properly account for relevant 
differences—i.e., those that determine who is equal or unequal to 
whom.  General rules, however, because they have to be formulated 
with some degree of abstraction, may not lead to fair applications in 
certain exceptional cases.  To deal with this problem, Aristotle suggests 
that rules that are prima facie universally applicable be qualified by 
some exceptions to allow for fairness in those relatively few cases in 
which a combination of factors makes application of the rule in question 
unfair.  In short, for Aristotle justice must be supplemented by equity.15 
Starting from the premise that justice must be predicated on the 
absolute equality between self and other, and confronted with the 
irreducible differences that distinguish self from other, Derrida 
 
rather than literally—in other words, for what they stand above all not for what they are in all 
their manifold complexity. 
 12 In addition to the above mentioned 1989 Cardozo presentation where Derrida focused on 
the first part of his work on justice, he discussed the second part at a conference held at UCLA in 
1990.  See Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 3, at 921.  So not only did Derrida’s ethical turn 
take place in America, but it did so from coast to coast. 
 13 This is what was attempted through the project of establishing a European Constitution to 
further bind the EU members together.  For such a constitution to be successful, the EU’s 
common identity would have to be strengthened.  For an interesting discussion of this need for a 
strong common identity, see Armin Von Bogdandy, The European Constitution and European 
Identity: Text and Subtext of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 3 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 295 (2005). 
 14 See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, at bk. V (Martin Oswald trans., 1980). 
 15 Id. at 1137b, lines 27-28. 
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radicalizes and transforms Aristotle’s insight.  For Derrida, in every 
case, justice requires simultaneous compliance with the appropriate 
universal rule and with its exception, thus making justice both necessary 
and impossible.16  Moreover, two important further consequences 
follow from this: strictly speaking, inasmuch as the law embodies 
general rules (or even general rules with exceptions), it cannot ever be 
just; and the pursuit of justice through binding law inevitably leads to 
violence inasmuch as it coerces the other to act or to refrain from acting 
in at least partial disregard of the other’s particular and irreducible 
identity, beliefs, and designs.17 
Derrida’s conception of justice as irreducibly tied to difference has 
important affinities at many levels with peculiarly American ways of 
dealing with law and justice from the 1960s through the 1980s.  For one 
thing, there were actual clashes among different conceptions of justice 
played out in the American political arena during the relevant period —
for example, the African-American conception of racial justice and 
equality, the feminist conception of gender-based justice and equality, 
and white male conceptions of justice and equality as applied to issues 
of race or gender.  Furthermore, both the African-American and the 
feminist struggles for justice projected a complex and differentiated 
approach to justice and equality that combined reliance on equality-as-
identity and equality-as-difference18 in ways that do not make for tidy 
unification or harmonization.  For example, a claim for equal pay for 
equal work regardless of race or gender is a claim for equal treatment, 
equality-as-identity, and universal justice.  On the other hand, demands 
for affirmative action on the basis of race or gender to rectify past 
injustices or to remedy current disadvantages due to past or present 
discriminatory treatment are consistent with equality-as-difference and 
with equitable exceptions to universal justice.19 
One can imagine that for one pondering these dilemmas 
confronting justice in America, Derrida’s deconstruction of justice 
would have special resonance.  Conversely, one can surmise (though 
there is no factual proof that I know of for this) that if Derrida’s focus 
on justice had been inspired by contemplation of the American 
dilemma, he would have inevitably been drawn to the ethical turn.  In 
other words, deconstruction of the above-mentioned American 
 
 16 See Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 3, at 949. 
 17 See MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 
60 (1998) [hereinafter ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS]. 
 18 See Michel Rosenfeld, Equality and the Dialectic Between Identity and Difference, in 
MULTICULTURALISM AND LAW: A CRITICAL DEBATE (Omid A. Payrow Shabani ed., 
forthcoming 2006). 
 19 For an extended discussion of the relationship between affirmative action and justice, see 
MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY (1991). 
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dilemmas of justice would quickly make it apparent that all interpretive 
issues that it raises are imbued with fundamental ethical implications. 
The affinities between Derrida and American approaches to law 
and justice go even deeper.  Indeed, Derrida’s conception of justice as 
difference comports better with the piecemeal nature of America’s 
common law approach, characterized by its attempts to reconcile the 
singularity of every individual case with broader trends over time, than 
with the deductive model of adjudication prevalent in the civil law 
systems of continental Europe.20  Furthermore, Derrida’s deconstruction 
of justice meshes well with important trends in American legal theory 
such as the Critical Legal Studies Movement (CLS) and pragmatism.  
For example, CLS emphasizes the dichotomy between law and justice 
and underscores the arbitrary nature of the distinction between the 
general rule and its exceptions in American Legal doctrine.21  CLS, 
through its critiques of American legal doctrine, shares a negative 
function with Derrida’s deconstructive approach.  But the latter exceeds 
and in a sense surpasses CLS precisely because of its ethical dimension.  
For both CLS and Derrida justice is impossible, though for CLS it is 
impossible due to prevailing power relations whereas for Derrida justice 
is impossible for ontological reasons regarding the irreducibility of self 
to other.  But only for Derrida is the unbending duty to pursue justice as 
if it were possible also necessary.  Finally, Derrida’s deconstruction of 
justice has affinities with American pragmatism, experimentalism, and 
openness to change and revaluation of tradition in as much as all of 
these unfold in a world that appears untidy, constantly in flux, and 
hence per force theoretically under-constructed. 
In the last analysis, the above-mentioned affinities between 
Derrida’s deconstruction of justice and America should not be 
interpreted as meaning that Derrida’s ethical turn yields a theory of 
justice, friendship, forgiveness, etc. that is American in nature or 
spirit.22  Instead, the role that America plays for Derrida’s theory is 
more modest though nonetheless crucial.  Specifically, America’s 
openness to diversity best exemplifies the practical implications of 
Derrida’s theoretical insights.  In addition, America plays an 
indispensable role as Europe’s veritable other.  In spite of these 
practical and theoretical moorings in America, however, as we shall 
now see, Derrida’s theory itself is solidly grounded in continental 
Europe. 
 
 20 See generally Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 (2001). 
 21 See, e.g., Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 
(1983). 
 22 As will be briefly discussed in Part II, infra, Derrida’s deconstruction of friendship, 
forgiveness, hospitality, etc. all reveal similar conflicts between the universal and the particular, 
as does his deconstruction of justice. 
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II.     DERRIDA’S ETHICS OF DIFFERENCE, TERRORISM, 
AND THE ENLIGHTMENT 
 
In the most general terms, Derrida’s deconstruction of ethics and 
politics draws on two clashing European philosophical traditions: that of 
Kant,23 and, as already mentioned, Nietzsche and Heidegger.24  To 
oversimplify while capturing the essential, on the one hand Derrida’s 
deconstruction of justice as necessary but impossible combines Kantian 
universalism and the categorical imperative, and on the other draws on 
the Nietzschean/Heideggeiran insight that the living, constantly 
evolving experience that confronts us in all its complex diversity and 
vitality can never be neatly captured, much less mastered, by reason.  In 
other words, when Derrida the philosopher of difference turns to the 
ethical, he encounters at once the strong normative call for a common 
bond of identity between self and other—a bond that Kant establishes at 
the level of transcendental idealism—and the obligation to account for 
the full panoply of differences of the irreducible other, though the self 
can at best have a partial glance into the diversity at stake. 
What emerges from this is an unbridgeable gap between the ethical 
duty to forge common bonds of identity with the other and the equally 
compelling ethical duty to account for the differences that cast the other 
as a singular other self, and to act in ways that accord full respect and 
consideration to those differences.  As already noted, in the context of 
justice, this gap is that between law and justice.25  One may craft laws 
with the intent of achieving justice, but these laws are bound to fall 
short as it is impossible to give full expression at once to the relevant 
general rule and to all its pertinent individualized exceptions.  
Moreover, similar gaps emerge in the context of deconstruction of other 
ethical relationships such as friendship or forgiveness.  The gap is 
between self-regarding and other regarding friendship and between 
proportional and hence conditional forgiveness and unconditional 
forgiveness.  Thus, to the extent that friendship towards another is based 
on an expectation of receiving something in return, it cannot be true 
friendship as it verges on a relationship based on mutual self-interest.  
True friendship is therefore impossible friendship, such as friendship 
toward the dead, who cannot be expected to provide anything in 
return.26  Similarly, forgiveness that is proportional, such as that 
extended to someone who has acted to rectify a situation or to 
compensate for a misdeed, is barely forgiveness.  On the other hand, 
 
 23 See, e.g., DERRIDA, VOYOUS, supra note 1, at 167-94. 
 24 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 25 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 26 See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITIQUES DE L’AMITIÉ 322-29 (1994). 
  
822 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
forgiveness that is not self-regarding is disproportionate, amounts to 
forgiveness of the unforgivable, and is problematic if not impossible.27 
The unbridgeable gap between the pole of identity and that of 
difference is problematic, particularly in relation to determining what 
specific norms or actions are called for.  For example, laws can never be 
just, but does deconstruction provide the means to determine which 
laws are more just or less unjust than others?  Clearly, laws that 
blatantly disregard the common ground between self and other or that 
consciously ignore differences that are generally recognized as 
constitutive of the other’s identity are unacceptably unjust.  But what 
about laws which in their own imperfect way seek to approximate 
justice? 
One plausible answer is that the best that can be done is to craft 
laws with an eye to justice in good faith, in other words, as best as one 
can.28  For example, neither laws imposing equal treatment nor those 
sanctioning affirmative action can promote full racial or gender-based 
justice.  Nonetheless, some may believe in good faith that the former 
laws come closer to justice, while others may believe in equally good 
faith the latter laws do.  Moreover, since neither of the two kinds of 
laws involved inherently seems significantly more unjust than the other, 
adoption of either would result in an acceptable good faith 
approximation of justice. 
However, such approximation, which may be acceptable in the 
context of justice, friendship, or forgiveness seems clearly inadequate in 
the context of terrorism.  On the one hand, terrorism looms as inherently 
and unexceptionally unacceptable no matter its cause or context.  The 
random killing of innocent civilians in New York on September 11, 
2001, Madrid on March 11, 2004, or London on July 7, 2005 ostensibly 
involves utter disregard for the other and thus constitutes a direct assault 
against Derrida’s ethics of difference.  Upon further deconstruction, on 
the other hand, the ethical status of terrorism can become much more 
murky.  Thus, for example, one person’s terrorism is another’s war of 
liberation.  As Derrida observes, “[e]very terrorist in the world claims to 
be responding in self-defense to a prior terrorism on the part of the state, 
one that simply went by other names and covered itself with all sorts of 
more or less credible justifications.”29  In terrorism linked to national 
self-determination, such as that of Basques in Spain, of the IRA in 
Northern Ireland, or of Palestinians against Israel, the struggle is against 
 
 27 See JACQUES DERRIDA, ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORGIVENESS 38-39 (Mark Dooley 
& Michael Hughes trans., 2001). 
 28 This notion of “good faith” has some resemblance to Sartre’s notion of authenticity.  See 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 86 n.10 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1966) 
(“authenticity” is self-recovery from “bad faith”).  Derrida was influenced by Sartre, see Jacques 
Derrida, Il Courait Mort: Salut, Salut, in 587 LES TEMPS MODERNES 7 (1996). 
 29 BORRADORI, supra note 7, at 103. 
  
2005] DERRIDA’S ETHICAL TURN  823 
a much more powerful and formidable adversary who is perceived as 
systematically negating and suppressing the core collective and 
individual identities of the people engaging in terrorism.  Moreover, 
even in global terrorism such as that perpetrated by Al Qaeda, the claim 
is that globalization aggressively imposes an order that assaults and 
undermines Islam and is destructive of the core identity of those who 
adhere to Islam. 
If pure disregard of the other is unequivocally unethical in the 
context of the ethics of difference, self-defense against state terrorism or 
global terrorism, against the other’s attempt to deny the self treatment as 
an other self, seems prima facie ethical.  Indeed, if even the quest for 
justice is inevitably accompanied by violence,30 violence necessary to 
prevent eradication of the self’s identity by the other seems eminently 
justifiable.  More generally, the obligation to forge common bonds of 
identity with the other must be deferred when it is necessary to engage 
in self-defense against the other’s attempts to destroy the self’s identity. 
Both global terrorists and those who seek to eradicate them accuse 
one another of seeking to destroy the other or the other’s identity.  
Accordingly, each seeks to justify violence against the other while 
condemning the violence of the other.  From the standpoint of 
deconstructive ethics, there is a similar gap between identity and 
difference in the context of terrorism as there is in those of justice, 
friendship or forgiveness.  Unlike the gap relating to justice, friendship 
or forgiveness, however, the gap concerning terrorism is unacceptable 
and unbearable.  Indeed, the gap relating to justice, for example, calls 
for further ethical commitment toward narrowing the divide between 
law and justice, but each effort in that direction seems acceptable so 
long as it is conducted in good faith.  In contrast, the gap relating to 
terrorism is unacceptable and unbearable even if approached in good 
faith because it at once implies self-preservation and annihilation of the 
other, and because any excess in either direction threatens the collapse 
of the very pursuit of a deconstructive ethics of difference. 
The unacceptable gap in the case of terrorism raises the question of 
whether the latter will ultimately prove to be the Achilles’ heel of a 
Derridean ethics of difference.  In other words, if each self (from its 
own differentiated perspective) can cast the other as the terrorist, and if 
there is no way to mediate between these diverse and often 
diametrically opposed perspectives, then there can be little hope that the 
self will even attempt any gesture toward the other.  And without such 
an attempt there cannot be ethical life.  To assess whether Derridean 
ethics is actually bound to reach such a dead end, it is now necessary to 
take a closer look at Derrida’s deconstruction of terrorism, and in 
 
 30 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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particular at how terrorism as difference fares in relation to the project 
of the Enlightenment. 
Global terrorism as understood by Derrida, unlike all other 
phenomena, is not amenable to the dialectic dynamic between identity 
and difference that shapes the deconstructive ethics of self and other.  
The reasons for this are, in turn, twofold.  On the one hand, global 
terrorism—as symbolized by the attacks of September 11, 2001 which 
are encapsulated in the sign “9/11”—is not amenable to further 
reference through language and hence remains beyond the meaning-
endowing discourse that allows for the development of ethical links 
between self and other.31  On the other hand, Derrida links global 
terrorism to something akin to an autoimmune disease of the 
contemporary Western democratic polity negotiating the passage from 
the Cold War to globalization, and in particular of the superpower that 
has led this transition, the United States.32  If, indeed, consistent with 
Derrida’s assessment, the United States’ push towards globalization and 
its consequent “victimization” by, and confrontation against, global 
terrorism are best viewed as an autoimmune attack, then global 
terrorism is a product or symptom of self-destruction.  To the extent that 
the self attacks itself, moreover, it destroys the very possibility of 
seeking to build bridges between self and other so as to encompass the 
full singularity and diversity of each, which is the paramount pursuit 
prescribed by a deconstructive ethics of difference.  In short, by 
remaining beyond language, global terrorism is destructive of the prime 
medium of interaction between self and other.  Furthermore, as part of 
an auto-destructive process akin to an autoimmune disease, global 
terrorism undermines the integrity—in the literal sense of the term—of 
the necessary interlocutors in any genuine intersubjective ethical 
project. 
Underlying Derrida’s conclusion that global terrorism is 
“unspeakable” are two principal factors: one quantitative, the other 
qualitative.  As Derrida notes, modern terrorism is not new; it traces 
back to Robespierre’s Reign of Terror during the French Revolution.33  
What is new with today’s global terrorism, however, is the magnitude of 
its potential destructiveness through the use of nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons.34  Accordingly, the threat posed by global terrorism 
does not naturally lead to discussion, but to unspeakable fear, panic and 
trauma. 
 
 31 See BORRADORI, supra note 7, at 147 (“For Derrida, by pronouncing 9/11 we do not use 
language in its obvious referring function but rather press it to name something that it cannot 
name because it happens beyond language: terror and trauma.”). 
 32 See id. at 140, 150-59. 
 33 See id. at 152. 
 34 See id. at 151. 
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From the qualitative standpoint, on the other hand, what 
distinguishes global terrorism from nationalist terrorism for Derrida is 
that the former projects an ideology that lacks any opening to the 
future.35  Global terrorism, moreover, has no future in at least two 
different senses.  First, it has no future as pure violence breeding further 
violence.  And second, it has no future in as much as Bin Laden and his 
associates seek imposition of a fanatical pre-modern religious ideology 
hermetically closed to the Enlightenment, modernity, and the present, 
let alone the future.36 
Before focusing more specifically on the relationship between 
global terrorism and the Enlightenment, it is necessary to take a brief 
look at what Derrida characterizes as America’s tendency towards 
autoimmune auto destruction in the context of globalization and global 
terror.  Essentially, at the highest levels of abstraction, the other who 
sets to destroy the self is located within the latter and finds its weapons 
of destruction within the self.  Thus, the 9/11 hijackers circulated freely 
in the United States, attended its flight schools, and turned its scheduled 
commercial jetliners into deadly weapons of terror.  Furthermore, by 
trying to protect itself from the assault of the other within itself, the self 
ends up becoming other than itself.  Thus, an open society with enemies 
within, like the United States, must sacrifice liberty to security to more 
effectively protect itself.  But in so doing it chips away at its identity as 
a free and open society. 
More specifically, Derrida focuses on the trajectory of the process 
of autoimmune auto-destruction in the context of the evolution from the 
end of the Cold War to globalization and to global terror.  According to 
Derrida, this process of auto-destruction has three phases.37  The first 
phase is traceable to the Cold War itself.  An example is the context of 
opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan, when the United States nurtured 
and sustained Bin Laden and his mujahadeen who would later turn 
against it and mastermind 9/11.  The second phase is located in the 
aftermath of the Cold War in the context of the concurrent spread of 
globalization and global terrorism.  The collapse of the Soviet Union 
has led to an arsenal of unguarded nuclear weapons which makes it all 
too possible that weapons of mass destruction may fall in the hands of 
global terrorists.  In addition, globalization has opened markets and 
borders, and the technological revolution in cyberspace has allowed for 
anonymous, instant world wide communication.  All of this inures to the 
benefit of the global terrorist who can now secretly and anonymously 
 
 35 See id. at 113.  Speaking of Bin Laden and his global terrorism, Derrida observes that 
“such actions and such discourse open onto no future and, in my view, have no future” (emphasis 
in original). 
 36 See id. at 113-14. 
 37 See id. at 150.  The following discussion draws on the account in id. at 150-52. 
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threaten mass destruction without any of the Cold War safeguards such 
as state control and reciprocal restraints based on the danger of mutual 
nuclear annihilation.  As a consequence of this post Cold War 
imbalance, global terrorism’s potential for mass destruction leads to 
widespread trauma, panic, and terror in all polities that feel targeted.  
Finally, the third phase is marked by the cycle of repression that 
characterizes the reactions to 9/11 and subsequent global terrorist 
attacks or threats.  To protect itself, the state must go against terrorists, 
and given the nature of the threat, it is often imperative that the state act 
preemptively.  But that leads to massive internal surveillance and 
repression and sets open societies on a course of self-destruction. 
Stripped to its essentials, the project of the Enlightenment can be 
said to consist in promoting universal adoption of the rule of reason and 
in ensuring protection of liberty and equality for all.  Arguably, the Cold 
War fits within the Enlightenment project, albeit with distortions and 
pathologies.  Indeed, both liberal capitalism and Marxist socialism rely 
on rationality and are committed to promoting liberty and equality for 
all.  The main difference between them is that they disagree sharply 
over what rationality, liberty and equality entail, and that explains why 
they were in conflict.  Nevertheless, the Cold War ideological divide is 
one that remains by and large within the confines of Enlightenment 
norms and values. 
And so does globalization, at least on first impression.  Overall, 
globalization consists of the spread of liberal capitalism and the 
rationality it entails worldwide beyond the strictures of nation-state 
control or regulation.  In an important sense, globalization is called for 
by the very logic of the rationality of liberal capitalism given existing 
material conditions and capacities.  Consistent with all this, moreover, it 
is only global terrorism anchored in pre-modern religious 
fundamentalism that stands squarely against the Enlightenment ideology 
and against any prolongation of the Enlightenment project. 
Derrida certainly shares with proponents of the Enlightenment 
ideology an unequivocal condemnation of global terrorism.38  His 
assessment of globalization, however, is not consistent with the one 
suggested above.  Moreover, whereas Derrida shares certain goals of the 
Enlightenment project, such as the development of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism,39 he remains critical of tolerance and instrumental 
reason, two key, Enlightenment values and tools.  More generally, 
Derrida’s radical ethical commitment to singularity and difference in 
their irreducible complexity and diversity is arguably incompatible with 
 
 38 See id. at 113 (Derrida makes it clear that though he has strong reservations concerning 
how Europe and the United States are handling the war against terror, he remains firmly on their 
side against terror). 
 39 See id. at 130. 
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successful pursuit of the Enlightenment project, and perhaps even 
undercuts the consistency of his unequivocal condemnation of global 
terrorism.  In other words, though there is no doubt about the sincerity 
of Derrida’s condemnation of global terrorism, is such condemnation 
the mere expression of personal emotion or is it consistent with a 
deconstructive ethics of difference? 
If one regards globalization as the culmination of the 
Enlightenment project, the end of the Cold War marks the end of a 
major split over the true legacy of the Enlightenment.  Consistent with 
this, moreover, globalization promises the eventual breakdown of 
remaining barriers to the world wide spread of instrumental rationality 
and tolerance; the creation of conditions conducive to cosmopolitan 
citizenship for all; and democracy beyond the confines of the nation-
state.  In a word, globalization would thus represent the triumph of 
reason over prejudices and passions, and global terrorism the last stand 
of parochial irrationalism.  More generally, the Enlightenment project 
has called throughout for a struggle against the darker side of humanity, 
and the struggle against global terrorism is but the most recent and quite 
probably the last chapter in this struggle. 
For Derrida, in contrast, if the project of the Enlightenment is 
properly placed in its actual historical context, the irrational, the partial 
and the parochial must be located within it, not outside of it.  In other 
words, when viewed historically, the Enlightenment project 
encompasses within its bounds aporias and contradictions that pose a 
series of concrete, historically situated challenges.  Accordingly, the 
Enlightenment’s ultimate success depends less on repelling outside 
threats than on charting a course that properly confronts internal 
obstacles and limitations. 
Deconstructive ethics is consistent with the promise of the 
Enlightenment, namely freedom and equality for all.40  The question 
then is not whether Derrida’s theory is contrary to the Enlightenment, 
but whether his deconstruction of the historicity of the institutions and 
values associated with the Enlightenment lead to negation rather than to 
deferral of freedom and equality for all.  To be in a better position to 
answer this question, it is necessary to take a closer look at Derrida’s 
deconstruction of globalization, tolerance, and democracy. 
In appearance, both tolerance and globalization are widely 
encompassing, open to all, and neutral.  As Derrida sees them, however, 
beneath the surface they are both to a significant degree exclusionary 
and far from neutral.  Just as there is for Derrida a gap between law and 
justice, there is also one between tolerance and hospitality and between 
globalization and equal cosmopolitan citizenship for all.  Finally, there 
 
 40 Id. at 172. 
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is also an insurmountable divide for Derrida between democracy as it is 
and the “democracy to come” (à venir), between rational pursuit of the 
will of the majority and the (impossible) equal treatment of the full 
singularity of every person within the global polity.41 
Derrida approaches tolerance historically and emphasizes that, 
traditionally, to be tolerated did not mean being treated as an equal, but 
rather as an object of condescension to whom is extended no more than 
mere acceptance.42  Tolerance is a Catholic virtue,43 and as such is it 
accorded from a position of strength by those who are confident of 
possessing the truth to those perceived by those in power as living in 
error.  Tolerance, therefore, is not for Derrida a relationship among 
equals, but rather a concession by the powerful to the powerless, and 
one that is subject to change or revocation at will.44  Derrida contrasts 
tolerance to hospitality.  For him, hospitality requires unconditional 
invitation and acceptance of all others to one’s home, community or 
polity.45  Tolerance, on the other hand, amounts to limited hospitality as 
it seeks accommodation of some but not others, and as it makes such 
accommodation conditional.46  Unconditional hospitality is ethically 
mandated but politically impossible—indiscriminate hospitality to all 
comers could prove self-destructive—whereas tolerance though an 
Enlightenment virtue ends up undermining the latter in as much as it 
stands in the way of, rather than promoting, equality for all. 
Like tolerance, globalization purports to promote freedom and 
equality for all, but in fact ends up doing the opposite.  Ideally, 
globalization is meant to level the playing field for all humanity by 
turning the entire planet into a single fully integrated market and a 
seamlessly conjoined unified world wide polity.  In point of fact, 
however, globalization has consisted of imposition of the sectarian 
partial and highly contested institutional practices and way of life of the 
most powerful nation-states on an ever increasing portion of the globe.  
Consistent with this, viewed through a Derridean lens, globalization is 
much less a movement of worldwide emancipation from the strictures 
of the nation-state than a kind of recolonization achieved though the 
economic might of the most powerful and through rapid spread and 
strategic use of sophisticated modern technologies.47 
 
 41 See id. at 120. 
 42 Id. at 127. 
 43 Id. at 126. 
 44 In contrast to Derrida, Habermas is convinced that present day tolerance can transcend its 
Christian origins and become a subject of dialogical give and take among equals.  See id. at 17-
18. 
 45 See id. at 127-30. 
 46 Id. at 127-28. 
 47 See id. at 121-24. 
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In Derrida’s view, globalization sets the globalizing polities, and 
the United States in particular, on a path of autoimmune self-
destruction.  This is done in part by unwittingly enabling the global 
terrorist or other enemy within, and, in part, by alienating the self from 
itself through repressive actions undertaken in self-defense and through 
dilution of its identity in the quest for global reach. 
The global terrorist is bent on resisting or countering the 
penetration of globalizing trends and ways of life through terrorizing 
violence in the name of a fundamentalist pre-modern religion.  
Significantly, the principal globalizing power, the United States, has 
also experienced a return to religion, or more precisely, a thorough 
politicization of religion.48  To some extent, consistent with Derrida’s 
assessment, these two convergences toward religion mirror one another 
as they mark a reaction against the disembodied obstructions produced 
by the rapidly spreading new technologies.49  Thus, both for American 
and for Islamic fundamentalists, religion provides the means to 
reestablish links to the concrete, or in other words, to reclaim singularity 
in the face of the sweeping homogenizing trend spearheaded by the new 
technologies.50 
If in spite of the convergence of America and global terrorism 
toward religion, as we have seen, Derrida unequivocally sides with 
America,51 it is that the religion that emerges in globalizing polities 
arises in a very different context than that in which Islamic 
fundamentalism prevails.  Indeed, notwithstanding its contradictions 
shortcomings, and pathologies, globalization loosens the barriers 
erected by the nation state and thus paves the way toward 
cosmopolitanism and equal citizenship for all the world’s inhabitants.  
Accordingly, even if America’s religion, taken by itself, had no more 
future than that invoked by the global terrorists, America’s globalizing 
enterprise taken as a whole is not without future provided, only that it 
can be rechannelled away from its autoimmune pathologies.  Religious 
America remains clearly preferable to Islamic fundamentalism, but 
Derrida regards secular Europe as much more favorable terrain than 
present day America for cosmopolitanism.52  Hence Derrida’s return to 
Europe after 9/11. 
The ideal of cosmopolitanism as conceived by Derrida derives 
from Kant and is thus firmly anchored in Enlightenment thought.  As 
Derrida explains, Kant thought that “we should probably give up the 
idea of a ‘world republic’ . . . but not the idea of a cosmopolitical law, 
 
 48 See id. at 117-18. 
 49 See id. at 157. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 52 See BORRADORI, supra note 7, at 140. 
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‘the idea of a law of world citizenship’ . . .”53  Today, Europe with its 
extensive transnational network, its serious commitments to 
international covenants such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and its secular vision, looms as propitious grounds for the 
implantation of world citizenship.  In contrast, the United States with its 
flouting of international law54 and hostility towards international 
organizations and institutions—such as the United Nations55 and the 
International Criminal Court56—does not loom as fertile ground for 
launching world citizenship, notwithstanding its extensive globalizing 
activities.  In the end, whereas Europe holds greater promise for world 
citizenship, it remains unclear whether the shortcomings and 
pathologies of globalization may be sufficiently overcome for genuine 
cosmopolitanism to take hold. 
Cosmopolitanism could extend democracy worldwide, but it is 
insufficient according to Derrida to bring about the “democracy to 
come[.]”57  The latter requires going beyond the limits of world 
citizenship to allow all persons on the globe to live together consistent 
with full respect for the irreducible singularity of each and with 
sufficient room for such singularity to flourish.58  Just as deconstruction 
emphasizes the gaps between law and justice, tolerance and hospitality, 
globalization and cosmopolitanism, so too it highlights the unbridgeable 
divide between actual democracy and ideal but impossible “democracy 
to come.” 
Democracy or self-rule by the Demos provides the best available 
means for reconciling self and other, identity and difference.  Ordinary 
democracy dependent on majority rule, however, must systematically 
sacrifice singularity and difference to rational pursuit of common 
interests shared by a majority of the polity’s citizenry within the 
constraints imposed by enforcement of fundamental rights.  In 
democracies on the scale of the nation-state, strangers or non-citizens 
within and without are essentially left out.  Worldwide citizenship 
overcomes this limitation by making it possible for all human beings to 
participate in self-government.  Moreover, world-wide citizenship 
without worldwide government allows for multiple centers of 
 
 53 See id. at 130. 
 54 One notorious example concerns the treatment of the detainees in the ‘war on terror’ held 
in Guantanamo.  See Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International 
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 
838-45 (2005). 
 55 See, e.g., Dan Robinson, US Lawmakers Keep Up Criticism of UN, THE EPOCH TIMES, 
April 21, 2005, http://English.@pochtimes.com/admin/makeArticle2. 
 56 See United States Unsigning Treaty on War Crimes Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 
6, 2002. 
 57 See BORRADORI, supra note 7, at 130. 
 58 Id. 
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democratic rule and for a wider diversity in clusters of common 
interests amenable to majority rule. 
Nevertheless, no democracy based on majority rule can do justice 
to democracy in its deepest and most radical sense, the “democracy to 
come,” which must be pursued but inevitably forever deferred.  This 
latter democracy requires self-rule not in pursuit of majority wishes, but 
in pursuit of what the singularity of each human being requires for that 
person and for all those with whom the person in question does or may 
interact.  Thus, the majoritarian compromises that shape ordinary 
democracy prove inimical to the “democracy to come.”  Moreover, only 
the latter democracy, if it ever could come in to being, could complete 
and fully vindicate the Enlightenment’s ultimate goal of freedom and 
equality for all. 
Consistent with the preceding analysis, it becomes plain that for 
Derrida pursuit of the project of the Enlightenment is necessary, but its 
achievement is impossible.  The historical unfolding of the 
Enlightenment’s heritage with its aporias and contradictions is to its 
ultimate realization in the “democracy to come” like law is to justice.  
Moreover, tolerance, globalization, global terrorism, and even 
cosmopolitan citizenship remain far removed and many pitfalls and 
reversals away from even an incipient breakthrough toward democratic 
self-rule based on singularity. 
Based on this conclusion, is Derrida’s unequivocal condemnation 
of global terrorism and his preferences for America’s globalizing 
mission and ever more intrusive religiosity sufficiently justified from 
the standpoint of a deconstructive ethics of difference?  That depends on 
the solidity of Derrida distinction between the global terrorists’ religion 
as having no future and America’s religion and self-destructive 
repression as nonetheless open to a better future.  As we shall see 
below, further deconstruction indicates that this distinction is at best 
shaky. 
 
III.     GLOBAL TERRORISM AND THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY  
VERSUS THE ETHICS OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Consistent with the Enlightenment’s promise of liberty and 
equality for all, ethical assessment pursuant to the corresponding canons 
of justice requires taking proper account of relevant identities and 
differences.  Ethics of identity based on the Kantian model of 
transcendental idealism tend to frame identity at such a high level of 
abstraction as to ignore or downplay relevant differences.  Ethics of 
difference, such as that based on Derridean deconstruction, on the other 
hand, tend to pursue difference to such a degree as to make establishing 
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a basis for common identity virtually impossible.  As discussed in Part 
II above, Derrida advances an argument for condemning global 
terrorism from the standpoint of a deconstructive ethics of difference.  
Derrida’s argument will be examined below and found to be ultimately 
unsupported by the ethics of difference.  On the other hand, Habermas 
has adapted monological Kantian idealism into a dialogical framework 
that allows for intersubjective consideration of diverse interests, and 
thus offers an ethics of identity that better accounts for difference.  As 
will be pointed out below, however, Habermas’s dialogical Kantianism 
is not sufficiently inclusive of diversity to yield a satisfactory balance 
between identity and difference. 
Derrida’s abovementioned distinction between the lack of future of 
the global terrorists’ Islamic fundamentalism and the openness to the 
future of America’s globalizing efforts and its further turn toward 
religion is at best precarious.  Indeed, by subjecting this distinction to 
further deconstruction, it becomes apparent that further differentiation 
casts doubt on Derrida’s claim that fundamentalist Islam has no future 
and on the proposition that America’s turn to religion does not pose a 
similar threat.  If global terrorism’s Islamic fundamentalism has no 
future, it is for at least one of two reasons.  First, Islamic 
fundamentalism is pre-modern and openness to the future requires 
taking the legacy of the Enlightenment into account, either as Derrida 
does—by trying to perfect it to meet current historical conditions—or 
by trying to go beyond its contradictions and limitations and into a yet 
to be defined post-Enlightenment era.  Second, global terrorism, unlike 
national terrorism, is bent on pure negation and destruction.  Thus, an 
Al Qaeda suicide bomber appears bent on pure destruction, whereas a 
Palestinian suicide bomber or a Basque ETA terrorist is ultimately 
motivated by the hope of bringing about liberation and self-government.  
Furthermore, by combining these two reasons, global terrorism appears 
to project pure negativity and to irrevocably turn its back to the future. 
Further deconstruction indicates, however, that neither of the two 
reasons discussed above nor their conjunction necessarily support the 
conclusion that global terrorism cannot be future-looking.  First, even if 
it is conceded that Islamic fundamentalism itself cannot be open to the 
future, it does not necessarily follow that its political use also need be 
thus limited.  If global terrorism is meant above all as a means of 
resistance against the evils of globalization, and if its use of Islamic 
fundamentalism is primarily intended for purposes of countering or 
slowing down the spread of globalizing forces, then it may well be 
largely oriented toward the future—a future in which globalization is 
limited, transformed, or transcended, and in which those whom it 
displaces, disfavors, or ignores will enjoy greater freedom and equality. 
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Second, whereas it may seem that Basque, Northern Irish or 
Palestinian terrorism is less nihilistic than Al Qaeda’s global terrorism, 
careful analysis does not bear out that impression.  If national terrorism 
or that fitted to the scale of the nation-state seems rational in relation to 
its ends, if not its means, it is because liberation and self-determination 
are worthy pursuits in the quest for freedom and equality for all.  That is 
at least the case from the subjective standpoint of those who feel unfree 
and oppressed.  Those who perceive themselves unfree and oppressed 
because of the intrusive inroads of globalization, moreover, are clearly 
in an analogous position even if their prospects of success are more 
unlikely—an assumption that is by no means obvious.  In other words, 
if there is any hope of moving closer to liberation and self-
determination at a sub-national, national, or supra-national level, then 
the ends pursued by global terrorists would seem as future-oriented as 
those motivating their counterparts who act on the scale of the nation-
state. 
On the other hand, if the current trend towards repolitization of 
religion in America is pursued to its logical culmination, then the 
United States may find itself plunged into a pre-modern universe that, 
for all relevant purposes, would be analogous to that of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Take, for example, the demand that creationism be 
taught in public schools.59  Creationism has no scientific basis,60 and 
accordingly were it to supplement, or substitute for, the teaching of 
evolution in public schools, it would violate a basic tenet of 
Enlightenment thought: the separation between science and religion.  
Moreover, if this separation were systematically eradicated, American 
society would return to a pre-modern state where the Enlightenment 
would have lost all future.  Accordingly, from the standpoint of the 
Enlightenment, there would be little difference between Islamic 
fundamentalism and full implantation of Christian fundamentalism in 
the United States. 
Consistent with the preceding observations, the deconstruction of 
global terrorism does not lend sufficient support to Derrida’s 
conclusions regarding lack of openness to the future.  Moreover, the gap 
between globalization and genuine cosmopolitan citizenship without 
world government and that between actual democracy and the 
“democracy to come” are unbridgeable and the ways to narrow them 
uncertain.  Accordingly, absolute condemnation of global terrorism 
cannot be systematically justified from the standpoint of a 
 
 59 See ADL Online, Religion in the Science Class?, http://www.adl.org/issue_religious_ 
freedom/create/creationism_QA.asp (“proponents of religious theories of creation have recently 
renewed—efforts to persuade public schools to teach creationism . . . either along side or in place 
of evolution”) (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). 
 60 Id. 
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deconstructive ethics of difference.  Since even the pursuit of justice 
involves perpetration of violence, and since the self is not ethically 
called upon to forgo violence when confronting the other’s threat to 
annihilate it or to eradicate its core identity, it is impossible to justify an 
unequivocal condemnation of global terrorism without a full grasp of its 
meaning.  But such a meaning is bound to remain elusive since it cannot 
be fully ascertained without future interpretation.61  Thus, for example, 
terrorism in the pursuit of national liberation against a cruel and 
repressive authoritarian regime may be justified ex post if it proves to 
have been a necessary step in the transition to a democratic regime that 
is committed to freedom and equality for all.  Similarly, it cannot be 
foreclosed that the interplay between globalization and global terrorism 
will lead to an institutional reorganization better suited to freedom and 
equality for all than would have been possible had globalization been 
fully realized without encountering any serious opposition or 
confrontation. 
In the final analysis, a deconstructive ethics of difference cannot 
yield an unequivocal and categorical condemnation of global terrorism.  
This is because, given its aim to accommodate all differences and 
singularities, the ethics of difference cannot sustain a sufficiently stable 
common identity to sift through competing claims regarding what is 
required for self-preservation and for protection of the core identity of 
the self.  In other words, as radical singularity precludes establishing a 
common intersubjective criterion to assess conflicting claims issuing 
from different perspectives, at least in the short run, each claim can only 
be evaluated from the standpoint of the subjective perspective from 
which it is made.62  Accordingly, without the benefit of long term 
hindsight, global terrorism could only be unequivocably condemned as 
nihilistic and without any future if those conclusions could be drawn 
from within the perspective of the proponents of such terrorism.  And 
they clearly cannot.63 
 
 61 See Rosenfeld, Deconstruction, supra note 2, at 157. 
 62 The difference between the short run and the long run is attributable to the fact that the 
hindsight of history (through future interpretations) may clarify whether a particular past 
subjective claim was compatible with the ethically mandated search for reconciliation between 
self and other.  Thus, if global terrorism were to lead to nothing but nihilism and destruction, then 
its subjective claim that it is necessary to the preservation of a valuable way of life would become 
susceptible to ex post facto refutation.  Conversely, if history were to prove that global terrorism 
contributed, albeit involuntarily or only partially, to a better reconciliation between self and other, 
then its subjective claim would receive some degree of ex post facto vindication. 
 63 This is at least the case with respect to the “defensive” claims of Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorists who see the West and America in particular as the “great Satan” bent on destroying the 
Islamic way of life through global spread of its economy, culture, and ideology.  See, e.g., Scott J. 
Zentner, A Just War: Friends, Enemies and The War in Iraq: A View from the Founding, 9 
NEXUS J. OP. 27, 40 (2004).  In contrast, the “offensive” or jihadist claims associated with global 
terrorism may be unequivocally condemned within an ethics of difference to the extent that even 
within the perspective from which they are made they negate the “infidel’s” right to self-
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Ethics of identity, such a those derived from Kantian 
transcendental idealism, on the other hand, have no difficulty in 
justifying universal unequivocal condemnation of all terrorism.  Kant’s 
own moral theory internalizes the Enlightenment’s commitment to 
freedom and equality for all and prescribes its realization at the highest 
levels of abstraction, thus setting a counterfactual ideal rather than 
providing moral principles susceptible of implementation through law 
and politics.  Specifically, Kant proposes universally applicable moral 
norms that are self-imposed.  According to Kant, every autonomous 
individual freely assumes the duties flowing from universally 
encompassing categorical imperatives derived from the premise that all 
individuals are of inherent equal moral worth and should therefore treat 
each other as ends in themselves.64  Consistent with the categorical 
imperative and the duty to treat all persons as ends in themselves, all 
killings, even those in self-defense—as the latter would involve treating 
another as a means to my own survival—are strictly morally prohibited.  
It obviously follows that all terrorism, let alone global terrorism, 
whether or not it involves killing, is deserving of absolute moral 
condemnation.  Indeed, to terrorize anyone and to instill fear and panic 
in others are clear proofs of intent to treat others as means rather than as 
ends. 
Kant’s categorical imperative rises above all differences in 
perspective or conceptions of the good and hence reduces every 
individual to an abstract, purely formal ego.65  To the extent that the 
Kantian moral individual is shorn of all interests, historical or cultural 
perspective, or conception of the good, all egos are interchangeable, and 
morality is ultimately susceptible to individual solipsistic derivation 
rather than to collective intersubjective construction.  Moreover, strict 
adherence to the categorical imperative makes morality impossible in 
the day to day world of law and politics.  Indeed, any contract or search 
for a majoritarian convergence of interests implies treating others, at 
least in part, as means to someone else’s ends rather than as ends in 
themselves.66 
Kant’s morals may thus provide a useful counterfactual for 
purposes of critical analysis but can offer little guidance regarding 
conflicting agendas launched from diverse perspectives within the 
realms of law and politics.  Habermas seeks to preserve the virtues of 
 
preservation or to his or her own chosen identity and way of life. 
 64 See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 53-54 (Robert P. 
Wolff ed., Lewis W. Beck trans., 1969). 
 65 Cf. G.W. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT Paras. 135, 135A (A.V. Miller trans., 1952) 
(criticizing Kantian morals as being purely formal and hence empty). 
 66 It is noteworthy in this connection that Kant himself places pragmatism ahead of morals 
when it comes to evaluating law. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch 
in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 118-19 (Hans Reiss ed., 1970). 
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Kantian ethics of identity while overcoming its solipsistic isolation and 
its radical sundering of morals from interests.67  Habermas counters 
Kant’s solipsistic monological approach with a dialogical approach,68 
and rejects Kant’s isolation of morals by reintroducing interests, 
inclinations and political outlooks within the intersubjective dialogical 
framework designed to yield legitimate moral and legal norms.69 
Habermas’s discourse ethics within a dialogical framework posits 
an ideal communicative setting within which all participants are 
oriented towards reaching a consensus and given an equal opportunity 
to present their claims.  Moreover, each of the participants must 
consider every claim from the perspectives of every other participant in 
the dialogue.70  Only those claims that are universalizable from the 
standpoint of all perspectives are to command a consensus of all 
participants and hence to become morally binding on all.71  In other 
words, unlike Kant, Habermas allows all interests from all perspectives 
associated with all conceivable conceptions of the good to be 
considered in the determination of morally binding norms.  However, 
because only universalizable claims can command consensus, 
Habermasian morals, just as their Kantian counterpart, must rise above 
all particular conceptions of the good. 
In Habermas’s discourse theory, morals and justice remain 
independent from any particular conception of the good.  This 
dichotomy between the right and the good can be criticized on several 
different grounds.72  For present purposes, it suffices to focus on 
discourse theory’s failure to properly account for difference through 
consideration of a single example that plays a crucial role in 
Habermas’s justification of his condemnation of global terrorism and of 
the religious fundamentalism that animates it. 
Contrary to Derrida, Habermas considers the pathologies 
associated with the Enlightenment project as being external to it and 
external to modernity.73  Thus modernity and communicative ethics 
require the rational pursuit of freedom and equality for all,74 but that 
pursuit can be thrown off course by irrationalism and communicative 
 
 67 For a succinct distinction of the main differences between Habermas’s discourse ethics and 
Kant’s moral theory, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION 195, 204 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry W. Nicholsen trans., 1990). 
 68 Id. at 203. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 122. 
 71 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 459-66 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
 72 For some of the main criticisms, see ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 17, 
at 137-38. 
 73 See BORRADORI, supra note 7, at 13, 70. 
 74 See id. at 79. 
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pathologies.75  Religious fundamentalism, moreover, constitutes for 
Habermas a violent external reaction against the deployment of 
modernity.76  Significantly, in Habermas’s view, religious 
fundamentalism does not depend on the content of the religious beliefs 
involved but instead on the modality of such beliefs.77  Indeed, 
modernity requires that religion see itself through the eyes of others, 
namely those of science, other religions, and political institutions of the 
democratic polity.78  The religious fundamentalist, however, refuses to 
relativize his own religion in this manner and hence defies the 
legitimacy of the Enlightenment project and of modernity. 
In terms of discourse ethics, this means that modernity and the 
relativization of religion should command a consensus as being 
universalizeable whereas any claim that a particular religion holds the 
truth could only result from pathological communication.  Upon further 
analysis, however, this conclusion seems to contradict the premises of 
Habermas’s ideal communicative setting.  Assuming that both the 
religious fundamentalist and the modernist are sincere and that both are 
open to reaching a consensus;79 and that both go through the exercise of 
considering the claims of the other from the perspective of the latter; 
then it would become apparent that there is no basis for a consensus 
among the two.  Their conceptions of the good are irreconcilable.  If one 
acknowledged that, one could fully account for difference, but would 
fail to discover any positive norms suited to filling the prescriptive 
needs of an ethics of identity.  If, on the other hand, one built in a 
requirement of rationality and a presumption in favor of modernity 
within the communicative framework designed to yield a moral 
consensus, then the fundamentalist’s view could be disregarded or the 
proponents of fundamentalism would recognize the error of their beliefs 
on the way to reaching a rational consensus.  Either way, the 
requirements of rationality and modernity are bound to lead to 
significant suppression of difference. 
In spite of his repudiation of Kant’s monological approach in favor 
of an inter-subjective dialogical one, Habermas succeeds no more than 
does Kant in properly accounting for difference in the context of his 
ethics of identity.  More generally, no theory predicated on positing the 
 
 75 Id. at 64 (Habermas regards terrorism as a communicative pathology). 
 76 Id. at 78. 
 77 Id. at 72. 
 78 Id. 
 79 A Habermasian may counter that a religious fundamentalist is in no meaningful way open 
to reaching a consensus as he is unwilling to budge from his claim that his religion is the truth, 
and that it is this very inflexibility that renders the fundamentalist’s position communicatively 
pathological.  However, if that is the case, then all opponents of modernism have no room in the 
communicative process designed to produce consensus on moral norms, with the consequence 
that such process would exclude consideration of a significant percentage of differences prevalent 
within the polity. 
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right and justice above the good is likely to take adequate account of 
difference.  Indeed, all such theories must either ignore all the diverse 
conceptions of the good (Kant) or downplay the differences among 
them or end up favoring some such conception at the expense of others 
(Habermas and giving priority to modernity). 
In the last analysis, neither the deconstructive ethics of difference 
nor the ethics of identity provides a sufficient balance between identity 
and difference to yield a convincing condemnation of global terrorism.  
I will argue below that such a balance could nonetheless be struck in the 
context of one theory that does not split justice and the right from the 
good.  That theory is pluralism, or, more precisely, what I have called 
“comprehensive pluralism.”80 
 
IV.     RECONCILING IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
GLOBAL TERRORISM: TURING TO PLURALIST ETHICS 
 
The advantage of a pluralist ethics is that whereas it seriously aims 
to accommodate difference, it refuses to treat irreducible singularity as 
an absolute, thus averting the shortcomings of Derridean ethics of 
difference.  By the same token, pluralist ethics guarantees a genuine, 
non-trivial ex ante equal hearing to all perspectives and conceptions of 
the good, including those of global terrorists, thus distancing itself from 
Habermasian and Kantian ethics of identity and from the split between 
the right and the good.  After a brief discussion of the salient features of 
a strong version of pluralist ethics, namely that of comprehensive 
pluralism, I will argue that the latter offers the optimal and most 
systematic condemnation of global terrorism consistent with striving for 
the best possible balance between identity and difference.  Finally, in 
light of the pluralist case against global terrorism, I will cast a last 
critical glance at Derrida’s views on global terrorism and at his “return” 
to Europe after 9/11. 
The basic tenet of comprehensive pluralism is that in societies that 
are pluralistic-in-fact—i.e., comprised of members with competing or 
conflicting perspectives and conceptions of the good—pluralism as a 
norm must ensure equal consideration of all points of view and the 
optimal possible balance between identity and difference.81  According 
to comprehensive pluralism, in pluralist societies maintenance, 
protection, and promotion of pluralism is normatively called for and 
ought to therefore be the goal of ethics and of law.  Specifically, 
normative pluralism requires striving for equal accommodation of all 
 
 80 See ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 17, at 199-234. 
 81 For a extensive discussion of comprehensive pluralism on which the following summary is 
based, see id. 
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existing conceptions of the good within the relevant society consistent 
with viable coexistence among such conceptions and among their 
respective proponents.  Furthermore, from the normative standpoint of 
pluralism, what constitutes the relevant society depends on the 
particular context involved and may range from a single institution 
within civil society, such as a university, to the entire globe.  
Accordingly, in the context of globalization and global terror, the most 
relevant societies are those of involved nation-states and that of the 
globe as a whole, and all those societies are invariably pluralistic-in-
fact. 
Comprehensive pluralism, consistent with the Enlightenment’s 
goal of freedom and equality for all, ideally seeks freedom for all to 
choose their own conception of the good and equality for all persons.  It 
also seeks equality for all perspectives and conceptions of the good held 
by one or more persons within the relevant society.  The above ideal 
constitutes the good from the standpoint of comprehensive pluralism.  
Comprehensive pluralism is thus a conception of the good, but one that 
differs from other conceptions in that it depends on inclusion of at least 
some of the latter for its own viability.  Take, for example, Christianity, 
communism and Serbian ethnocentric nationalism.  Each of these 
constitutes a separate conception of the good82 that does not depend for 
its viability or realization on embracing in part or whole any other 
conception of the good.  Quite to the contrary, the viability of these 
conceptions is much more likely to depend on rejection of other 
conceptions than on incorporation or accommodation of them.  In the 
case of comprehensive pluralism, however, unless there are other 
conceptions to incorporate or accommodate, pluralism itself becomes 
meaningless.  Hence, as a conception of the good, comprehensive 
pluralism is parasitic on accommodation of other conceptions of the 
good. 
In actual societies, some conceptions of good are favored over 
others, or promoted to the exclusion of others.  Because of this, 
achieving conformity with comprehensive pluralism requires the 
performance of two separate tasks.  The first is a negative one that 
requires leveling all hierarchies and preferences and casting all 
conceptions of good regardless of their content as equal and as prima 
facie equally entitled to recognition and protection.  Thus, the 
conception of the good of the global terrorist stands in the same position 
as all other conceptions of the good within the same relevant society, at 
 
 82 Viewed from the outside, each constitutes a distinct conception of the good even if, viewed 
from the inside, they can split into many such conceptions.  Thus, Christianity is a single 
conception as against atheism, Judaism, or Hinduism, but that does not foreclose there being 
many different conceptions of Christianity such as Catholic ones and Protestants ones. 
  
840 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
least in this first negative moment in the deployment of comprehensive 
pluralism. 
The second task, to be performed in a second moment, is the 
positive one of attempting to reconcile as much of each competing 
conception of the good as is consistent with a principle of equal 
accommodation for all conceptions of the good.  This reconciliation 
should be consistent with peaceful coexistence among them and among 
their respective proponents.  In this second positive moment, although 
the objective is a maximum of accommodation and inclusion, individual 
conceptions of the good will fare differently according to their degree of 
compatibility with competing conceptions.  Thus, a conception 
exclusively bent on eradication of all other conceptions would have to 
be altogether excluded.  And, to the extent that the conception of the 
good promoted by proponents of global terrorism is solely focused on 
destruction of those who not share that conception, it would have to be 
totally excluded and unequivocally condemned.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, a conception of the good that is wide open to diversity and 
that considers tolerance and accommodation to be paramount would 
have to be admitted pretty much on its own terms.  Finally, in between 
these two ends of the spectrum, for example in the case of an intolerant 
proselytizing religion that nonetheless abhors violence, accommodation 
is warranted but not on that religion’s own terms.  Instead, such religion 
should be included on comprehensive pluralism’s terms, which may 
mean that it would have to confine its activities to the private sphere. 
In order to systematize what the negative and positive moments of 
comprehensive pluralism require, a distinction must be drawn between 
the norms issuing from conceptions of the good vying for recognition 
on one hand, and accommodation within a society and the norms that 
emanate from comprehensive pluralism itself on the other.  The norms 
linked to all conceptions of the good other than comprehensive 
pluralism can be referred to as first-order norms; those pertaining to 
comprehensive pluralism as second-order-norms.  Furthermore, if one 
breaks down conceptions of the good into the bundle of first-order 
norms that they promote, then those first-order norms that are 
compatible with the deployment and functioning of second-order norms 
ought to find admission (though not necessarily on their own terms) in a 
polity committed to comprehensive pluralism.  It is important to 
underscore that not only first-order norms consistent with second-order 
norms satisfy the above criteria.  Indeed, a first-order norm that is 
inconsistent with second-order norms, but not incompatible with the 
functioning of the latter, also has a place within a pluralist polity.  For 
example, a fundamentalist religion that believes it possesses the 
absolute truth but that only seeks to spread its message peacefully and 
has no design to take over the government runs counter to the basic 
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tenets of comprehensive pluralism.  It ought, nonetheless, be admitted in 
the pluralist polity in as much as it does not threaten the functioning of 
an open and inclusive society. 
This last example underscores that comprehensive pluralism is 
more open to difference than Habermas’s discourse ethics.  Indeed, 
unlike Habermas—who justifies exclusion of fundamentalist religion on 
account of its modality of belief—comprehensive pluralism can 
accommodate fundamentalism so long as it forgoes violence and any 
design to capture the public sphere.  On the other hand, in its negative 
moment, comprehensive pluralism is compatible with Derrida’s 
insistence on singularity.  In its positive moment, however, 
comprehensive pluralism is committed to limiting deference to 
difference to the extent necessary to sustain a minimum of common 
identity within the relevant unit.  That minimum of identity is what is 
required to maintain a fair and workable level of intersubjective give 
and take to accommodate as much diversity as possible without risking 
a breakdown of the polity.83  Accordingly, in its insistence that the 
practical need for unity limit the extent of recognition ultimately 
accorded to difference, comprehensive pluralism embraces an ethics 
that is inconsistent with Derrida’s conception of an unbreakable bond 
between the ethics of difference and the ontology of singularity.  For 
comprehensive pluralism, from an ethical standpoint, singularity is only 
worthy of pursuit so long as it does not threaten the unity of the relevant 
sociopolitical unit. 
Based on the proper integration of its two moments and on reliance 
on the interplay between first-order and second-order norms, 
comprehensive pluralism allows for a systematic condemnation of 
global terrorism that does not suffer from weaknesses similar to those of 
Derida’s condemnation.  Consistent with pluralism, global terrorism 
must be unequivocally condemned regardless of whether it is purely 
nihilistic and without any openness to the future or whether it is in the 
name of a worthy goal that it alone appears capable of bringing about.  
Terrorist means are contrary to comprehensive pluralism’s second-order 
norms and hence have no place in any polity—at least so long as one 
cannot justify them as the sole available means to avert personal 
annihilation or total destruction of a group’s ability to live in accordance 
with the dictates of its conception of the good.84  Globalization and 
 
 83 This does not foreclose peaceful secession.  Comprehensive pluralism is as compatible 
with designing institutions to share a common space or dividing political space so that each of 
two incompatible conceptions of the good can rule unhindered within its own space.  Of course, 
at the level of global society, secession is not an option and accommodation becomes mandatory. 
 84 Although it is not possible to elaborate this line of argument any further here, presumably 
some instances of national liberation terrorism, particularly if directed exclusively against 
military targets, may be warranted under comprehensive pluralism.  This may be the case in the 
context of a particularly oppressive colonial regime that held the indigenous population in virtual 
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American economic expansion world-wide may threaten the way of life 
of religious fundamentalists, but neither seeks to annihilate the 
proponents of fundamentalist religion nor do they use coercive methods 
or concerted violence to eradicate such religion.  In fact, globalization 
threatens fundamentalist religion mainly through the spread of ideas and 
promotion of a way of life that are inimical to fundamentalist tenets.  
Under these circumstances, the greater threat to fundamentalism is 
likely to be coming from within as exposure to Western ideas and ways 
of life are likely to draw certain members of fundamentalist groups 
away from their religious traditions.  Since the second-order norms of 
pluralism require room for open circulation of ideas among proponents 
of different conceptions of the good, it is entirely inconsistent with 
pluralism to shield proponents of particular conceptions of the good 
from exposure to, and possible influence by, other conceptions of the 
good.  In short, consistent with pluralism, religious fundamentalists are 
not entitled to exclude other ideologies and viewpoints by peaceful 
means, let alone by terrorist violence. 
Both the message of the global terrorist (as opposed to the means 
used to convey that message) and that of the proponents of globalization 
are entitled to full protection within a pluralist polity.  Moreover, both 
fundamentalist religion and the ideology of global capitalism, to the 
extent they are compatible with the functioning of second-order norms, 
are entitled to accommodation and protection in a pluralist society.  
Conversely, within such society, the coercive aspects of fundamentalist 
religion and of globalization ought to be neutralized or rejected. 
The above discussion lays out an ideal pluralist blueprint for 
handling the clashes between globalization and Islamic fundamentalism.  
Proponents of global terrorism could argue, however, that, as a practical 
matter, there is such a huge discrepancy in power between globalizing 
forces and those determined to resist them that the latter will be simply 
swallowed up unless they use terrorism as a means to defend their core 
identity.  In other words, in line with this argument, the global terrorist 
is an analogous position to that of the nationalist terrorist who struggles 
against virtual enslavement by an authoritarian and repressive colonial 
regime. 
Upon closer inspection, this latter argument is unpersuasive for a 
number of reasons.  Perhaps the most important of these from the 
standpoint of comprehensive pluralism is that both the Western polities 
that promote globalization and the Islamic societies where the most 
concentrated and violent sources of resistance are found are pluralist-in-
fact.  Indeed, there are debates within globalizing polities, including the 
United States, concerning the proper scope and limits of globalization.  
 
slavery. 
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For example, laid off textile workers may have very different views on 
the matter than venture capitalists.85  Similarly, there are proponents and 
beneficiaries of globalization in Muslim countries, and in many of these 
countries there have long been profound divisions among proponents 
and opponents of Islamic fundamentalism.86  Furthermore, the tools and 
institutional arrangements at work in the process of globalization are 
radically different from those at play in a repressive colonial regime.  
Thus, for example, even if the economy were in fact fully globalized, 
there is no veritable global polity or government.  This allows for 
coexistence of a multiplicity of overlapping clashing and competing 
layers of pluralist-in-fact social units in which proponents of various 
conceptions of the good can vie to acquire increased influence and 
political power.  In short, the multiple opportunities for a pluralist give 
and take available in the evolving relevant contexts belie the claim that 
terrorism constitutes the sole means to resist, modify, or counter the 
efforts produced by the forces of globalization. 
Concerning religious fundamentalism itself, from the standpoint of 
comprehensive pluralism, American Christian fundamentalism is no 
better than Islamic fundamentalism inasmuch as they both seek to 
impose they own truth, which they deem absolute, on the polity as a 
whole, be it the nation-state or the entire planet.  In contrast, secularism 
is compatible with comprehensive pluralism so long as it does not 
trample on religion more than the absolute minimum necessary to 
ensure the proper functioning of second-order norms.  Accordingly, 
Europe’s stance relating to globalization and global terror clearly seems 
more in tune with pluralist norms and values than does America’s 
stance. 
In as much as America’s reaction to global terrorism has been 
religious, authoritarian, intolerant, and coercive, Derrida seems justified 
in having opted for Europe after 9/11 and wise in his decision to 
“return” to it.  Paradoxically, however, America still looms as more 
diverse than Europe.  Whereas Europe is still consumed with the search 
for its identity,87 America is divided and the turn to fundamentalist 
religion highly contested.88  Accordingly, Derrideans should not lose 
sight of the American roots of deconstruction’s ethical turn.  On the 
other hand, perhaps the return to Europe will underscore that from an 
ethical as opposed to an ontological standpoint singularity can be taken 
 
 85 See, e.g., Patrick Conway et al., The North Carolina Textiles Project: An Initial Report 3 
JTAM no. 3 (Fall 2003). 
 86 See, e.g., Ghassan F. Abdullah, New Secularism in the Arab World,  
http://www.secularism.org/skeptics/secularism.htm. 
 87 See Joseph Ramoneda, Europe: An Identity Against Civil War, OPEN DEMOCRACY, June 2, 
2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/articles/2568.html 
 88 See generally NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM 
AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (2005). 
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too far.  In any event, from a pluralist perspective, the optimal 
equilibrium between identity and difference needs to be struck in a 
place that stands halfway between Europe and America. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Derrida’s deconstruction of ethics and the ethics of difference that 
it propels cast invaluable light on the struggle to bridge the gap between 
identity and difference and self and other.  They also productively recast 
the Enlightenment’s project by placing it in its proper historical 
perspective and by highlighting its internal challenges and 
contradictions.  Whereas the unequivocal condemnation of global 
terrorism that Derrida derives from his ethics of difference proves to be 
right, the justifications he offers for it remain unsatisfactory.  This is 
primarily due to overemphasis of the ethical import of radical 
singularity.  By being so focused on differences, the crucial 
countervailing identities become blurred.  I have argued that 
comprehensive pluralism can make up for this deficiency by striking a 
proper balance between identity and difference consistent with the need 
to provide principled yet specific answers to the crucial ethical 
questions raised by the encounter between globalization and global 
terrorism. 
There remains one vexing problem that arises in connection with 
Derrida’s conclusion that the apparent vicious cycle that binds 
globalization, global terrorism and repression together is the result of a 
process of self-destruction that mimics the progression of an 
autoimmune disease.  The problem in question is that such autoimmune 
condition may render further pursuit of the Enlightenment project 
impossible and altogether destroy the very basis for pluralist ethics.  
Indeed, pluralist ethics require constant relationships between self and 
other,89 the maintenance of a dialogue between them, and the possibility 
of accommodation and coexistence between them—these being 
guaranteed by implementation of second-order norms in the context of 
comprehensive pluralism.  If the self attacks itself and becomes its own 
enemy, and if it cannot avoid harboring its enemies within itself, then 
dialogue, accommodation, and any relationship between self and other 
that is not one of pure enmity become impossible.  Stated differently, 
the autoimmune condition associated with global terrorism destabilizes 
and eventually destroys all relationships between self and other by 
foreclosing dialogue and accommodation by heading seemingly 
 
 89 This does not preclude that self and other evolve over time, but it require that there be at all 
times relationships between two or more interlocutors that regard one another as self and other. 
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inexorably toward self-directed violence and enmity against the other 
within.  This leaves no room for any kind of pluralism, let alone 
comprehensive pluralism. 
Whether Derrida’s autoimmune analogy is apt, and whether 
therefore global terrorism may be condemned, in theory, by a pluralist 
ethics that it, in practice, renders inoperative are questions that must 
await another day.  For the moment, the hope is that adherence to 
pluralist ethics can lead to breaking up the cycle of violence unleashed 
by global terrorism instead of being swept away by its unstoppable 
thrust. 
 
